With China as Backdrop, Past Shapes Japan-Korea Ties

WASHINGTON (IPS) — Relationships between nations are always complex, but how do you characterise a relationship that is burdened with historical grievances, present-day rancour and future uncertainties? In addition, imagine a large ambitious neighbour hovering nearby, ready to exploit any opportunity.

This is the case in the dry, cold atmosphere of today's North-east Asia. Korea and Japan, despite more than four decades of normal diplomatic relations, have yet to come to grips with their shared past, frequently roiling relations that send ripples far beyond their borders.

While both nations feel a need to ally in order to balance their powerful neighbour and emerging superpower China, historical grievances manifested in emotional spats have made a formal alliance almost impossible.

This is of concern for the United States, which is anxious to "contain" the rise of China. It is tightly allied to both Korea and Japan, but appears unable to facilitate a smoother relationship between the two nations.

Just how complex the situation is was illustrated during a January 2006 conference in Washington DC hosted by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA.

Noted experts from South Korea, Japan and the United States, viewing the problem with different lenses, often failed to agree on the present. They also offered different visions of the future. Just about the only thing they could agree on was the past.

But it is the past — and its differing interpretations, shaped by South Korea's experience of more than three decades under Japanese colonial rule — that lie at the heart of the present-day estrangement and raises questions about future of Korea-Japan relations.

While that sums up the pessimism in today's Korea-Japan ties, not all that is happening is negative. According to renowned Korean expert on Japan, Dr Park Cheol-hee, significant changes in Korea-Japan dynamics are occurring in the non-government sector, particularly among peoples of both countries. While government-to-government ties remain unwieldy and frozen, the relationship between the peoples have improved considerably to the point of being "reconciled", he explained.

Citing a host of recent data, he said: "This means that ordinary people in Korea and Japan just naturally accept each other. So when they meet and when they talk, they are not necessarily thinking about history issues at all. This is a drastic departure from the past. I would say it seems as if the public, the ordinary public, virtually made a kind of historic reconciliation."

Dr Park's contention adds a new and intriguing twist to the Korea-Japan debate. Can governments and their people be separated, especially in democratic societies where government action often reflects public opinion? And if so, can the people ignore their recent history for the benefit of the present?

History is important to understanding this issue. Japan's imperial conduct before and during World War II, especially the occupation of South Korea and parts of China, has burdened North-east Asia with long-standing grievances.

Both Korea and China feel that Japan has not done enough to address its past misconduct.

Moreover, the Japanese Prime Minister's annual pilgrimage to the Yasukuni shrine, where Japanese war criminals are among those buried, the refusal by Japan to review its revisionist history textbooks and claims of sovereignty over certain islands, are seen as Japan's indifference to the sentiments of its former victims.

The Japanese, on the other hand, do not dispute history. But they take exception to the demands of Korean and Chinese public opinion.

Many Japanese, especially the younger generation, feel they have apologised enough for past behaviour. They want an assertive foreign policy, and view irritants as the Yasukuni shrine visit as a show of Japan's independence from foreign pressure. A question of "autonomy", as one Japanese diplomat put it at the conference.

That sentiment was put aptly by Kojo Yoshiko, a Japanese academic, at the same seminar. "In Japan, the younger generation of politicians tends to be more assertive than the older generation when they talk about Japan's foreign policy toward neighbouring countries. Their stance is that we cannot keep apologising and we have to speak up especially relating to our foreign policy and so we have to be more autonomous than before.''

''This kind of stance is easily accepted by the public when Japanese people see in the media that anti-Japanese movements in China and Korea are increasing," he pointed out.

Yoshiko cast doubts on Dr Park's central thesis about "reconciliation" among peoples, arguing that empirical evidence since 2001 showed declining "familiarisation" about Korea among Japanese citizens.

The debate on Japan-Korea relations gains a sharp edge when geo-political considerations are factored in. The rise of China and its impact on regional security, as well as the uncertainties posed by the Stalinist regime in North Korea, forms the backdrop of this consideration.

U.S. foreign policy thinkers' best hope is for Korea and Japan to settle their differences and form a united front to manage the geo-strategic uncertainties posed by China and North Korea. But South Koreans see China as leverage to get concessions they seek from Japan.

Park couldn't be clearer when he summarised this aim: "The United States better keep both Korea and Japan as strong alliance partners in order to maintain peace and stability in the region. However, the history issue is something that messes up the situation. If the history issue continues to surface as the issue that antagonizes nations in East Asia, Korean emotion will drift away from Japan reluctantly, not willingly. China will gain much more from these dynamics."

Some U.S. experts, on the other hand, view the constant harping about the past as a roadblock to better ties between Korea and Japan.

Park narrated an instance when a senior U.S. official asked Korean leaders to jettison past grievances in the interests of strengthening ties with Japan. But the deep public sentiments make it impossible for any Korean leader to bow to such requests.

Indeed, Korean President Roh Moon-hyun has shown a remarkable tendency to throw diplomatic caution to the winds by pandering to Korean public opinion.

Similarly, Japanese politicians too will refrain from overtly bowing to foreign demands lest they antagonise domestic opinion. Herein lies the dilemma: the role of public opinion in forging better ties among nations who share a troubling past.

Kent Calder, a U.S. expert on North-east Asia, giving the example of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's annual visit to the Yasukuni shrine, says: "It seems to me on the Yasukuni issue, Prime Minister Koizumi is pretty well locked in. He's determined what he feels he has to do. A key issue now is the extent to which (incoming Japanese leadership) are locked in to similar stances, not only on Yasukuni but on a variety of other issues."

While nature of democratic societies and governments make government leaders susceptible to public opinion, they should also be able to seize moments in history when they can lead public opinion, not merely follow it, experts argue.

As Park put it: "Leaders should take the lead to promote cooperation and collaboration among countries, rather than trying to divide the nation and the conflict-driven nationalist movement." (Inter Press Service Asia-Pacific)