JAPAN-U.S.: Time for Two Powers’ Alliance to Grow Up
Analysis by Wendy Wilson
WASHINGTON, Nov 8 — In Asia's changed security environment, Japan is searching for its right role: It wants to become a stronger, more independent regional power, but at times seems to prefer avoiding tough international issues.
Today, Japan is struggling to assert a new nationalism, complete with formally-adopted flag and anthem. In some respects, it yearns to be the 'Switzerland of the Far East', respected by all, removed from the fray.
Yet the end of the Cold War heralded a fresh onslaught of security threats in the region, threats too overwhelming for Japan to ignore or to handle on its own. These include North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, China's rising military power and growing influence, and potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Fearing abandonment, Japan clings ambiguously to its bilateral alliance with the U.S. and the security umbrella provided by Washington since the end of World War II.
Ironically, Japan is just as concerned that it will be dragged into conflict by American involvement in the Asia-Pacific, as it is worried about being left solely in charge of its own defense without U.S. military presence.
For many years, the US-Japan alliance has been plagued by internal friction.
When one country's economy has been stronger than the other's, the resulting tensions have netted implications for concerns way beyond trade negotiations. Unresolved jealousies quickly make their way onto a diplomatic seesaw.
"Japan has done its best to stabilise the global economic picture," claimed Masayuki Tadokoro of the National Defense Academy University in Yokosuka, Japan, speaking at a forum by the Sasakawa Foundation for Peace here on Nov. 6. "It pumped money into the American economy in the late 1980s."
Apart from this flood of Japanese investment, however, the alliance flagged.
Freed from the strategic constraints of containing the Soviet Union in the post-Cold War years, the two countries allowed their relationship to languish in its earlier incarnation, without benefit of revival or revision.
Meanwhile, Japan's impressive economic ascent was followed by an increase in its international prestige and influence.
Tokyo charted a course of "checkbook diplomacy" as it contributed to humanitarian efforts and other non-traditional areas of security in developing countries, often in cooperation with the U.S. It remains the world's biggest aid donor.
Japan's desire to be considered a serious international player remains, and today the U.S.-Japan alliance is a priority once again for both countries.
Even in its "rickety" financial situation, "Japan's position is to support American primacy. The kind of order where American power excels," contended political analyst Tadokoro.
He suggested that Japan's slow economy may in fact be the "political logic" that sustains the historical dynamics of the alliance.
Not all agree that this is a good thing. "It's time to transform from a traditional alliance to something else," said Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, a Japanese specialist in alliance theory from Tokyo's Aoyama Gakuin University. "Nothing can continue forever. The U.S.-Japanese alliance is not the exception."
Others in Japan share Tsuchiyama's view, but for different reasons.
Japan's domestic political structure is in turmoil. A series of scandals and diplomatic missteps by leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has distracted politicians, who are in a wild scramble to resolve short-term internal issues, neglecting long-term international ones.
Their detachment perpetuates the American opinion that the risk- averse Japanese are so steeped in "status-quoism", they must be forced to be pro-active in the regional affairs.
The Japanese would counter that they have done so, on their own terms, while others would agree they received mixed results.
On the plus side, the Japanese have initiated a successful new relationship with Australia.
On the other hand, the Japanese news agency Kyodo reported recently that in 1997, Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori — then chairman of the LDP's Executive Council — made a "secret promise" to send half a billion tonnes of rice to North Korea.
This was something Tokyo recently announced it would do, opening Mori to accusations that he was fulfilling the earlier pledge to Pyongyang.
In another embarrassment, Mori confided to British Prime Minister Tony Blair recently that he had conjured up a fictional "third country disappearance" to explain the kidnapping of Japanese by North Korea, ostensibly to help the latter save face. The issue remains most sensitive to many Japanese.
Despite official denials, the appearance of deception and fraud, coupled with other gaffes by Mori, has seriously impaired the credibility of Japan's diplomacy that has supposedly been becoming more independent.
Japan's pursuit of advanced arms purchases, reconnaissance satellites and ballistic missile defense is significant evidence of the country's desire to establish a more assertive and autonomous security posture.
In light of Washington declaring China a "strategic partner," a good case can be made for Japan's attempts to establish its own international connections.
Meantime, some say growing public opinion in Japan for a more assertive security and foreign policy is but natural for a country of its size and clout, despite fears by some about a reversion to a militaristic past.
A Japanese revision commission is examining Article 9, the post- World War II 'Peace Constitution' which allows the country to maintain armed forces for self-defense only.
Removing that self-imposed barrier is a triple-edged sword. Without Article 9 restrictions, the Japanese would have less reason to host U.S. military presence, and have take on more responsibility for their own security.
However, the outcome of the Article 9 debate will make an undeniable impact on Japan's future ties with the United States.
In addition, Japan's Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) is a topic under much discussion by both parties, as much for its cost as for its need.
According to Michael Green, senior fellow for Asian Security at the Council for Foreign Relations, "The Japanese want a lot of redundancy in their system: their own sensors and cueing, the complete (system). But with a cost of 5 to 10 billion dollars, they may have to rely on the U. S. to provide that part of it."
One Japanese analyst cynically remarked that TMD stood for 'totemo miachigatte-iru defense', or "absolutely unbelievable defense".
The 'threat of peace' — if a reunification of Korea occurs — throws more uncertainty into already complex U.S.-Japan ties. Reconciliation on the Korean peninsula would undercut the rationale for large U.S. military presence there, affecting what has been for five decades a security pillar for Tokyo.
Japan's recession may also affect how far it can go in forging its own security profile. Some here say its political structure is incapable of creating strategies for change, but Washington must learn to cooperate with Tokyo without condescension, if it hopes to revitalise the alliance effectively.
"As the Japanese political order is experiencing protracted change, a similar process is at work in the United States," says a recently report issued by the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the U.S. National Defense University.
"Episodic executive branch leadership has failed to produce a well-conceived game plan for America's relationship with Japan, (accelerating) the erosion of political support and popular understanding of the importance of the alliance," states the bipartisan document.
"Nobody believes (the alliance) will continue for the next 100 years," remarked analyst Jitsuo Tsuchiyama. "Maybe 10, 20 years, or one generation, but no more than half a century." (IPS/2000)
